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Library: Knowledge
Title:      Knowledge
Categories:      Philosophy
BookID:      23
Authors:      Kevin Wall, O.P.
ISBN-10(13):      0000000023
Publisher:      Western Dominican Province
Publication date:      July 10, 2018
Number of pages:      22
Language:      Not specified
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Essays on knowledge 


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Title: Knowledge Author: Kevin Wall, O.P. Published online: July 2018 Previously unpublished Rights: Copyrighted 2018. Rights are owned by Western Dominican Province. Copyright Holder has given Institution permission to provide access to the digitized work online. Transmission or reproduction of materials protected by copyright beyond that allowed by fair use requires the written permission of the copyright owner. In addition, the reproduction of some materials may be restricted by terms of gift or purchase agreements, donor restrictions, privacy and publicity rights, licensing and trademarks. Works not in the public domain cannot be commercially exploited without permission of the copyright owner. Responsibility for any use rests exclusively with the user. The Nature of Knowledge 1. Relational Stages 1. In God 1. identity 2. In angel 1. real relation of knower to own essence (known is in knower) 2. identity (knowledge of thinking) 3. real relation of knower to other things through infusion 4. identity 3. In man 1. real relation of knower to other things through action of other things upon it (infusion plus action of other things) 2. identity (knowledge of thinking) 3. knowledge of essence through this (real relation of knower to known through self-consciousness) 2. Knowledge, Causality and Will These three are identical in the divine creative action. But it is clear that not every divine act is causality. This occurs only when the act of the will is choice with respect to creatures. Thus, divine knowledge and divine choice are separable. God knows and wills by necessity of nature but does not choose by this necessity. By consideration of this, metaphysics determines what knowledge, volition and causality are and how and why they are 1 separable in the creature and why and how the causality of the creature is limited whereas that of God is not. Basically, the distinction comes through the fact that the knowledge and the volition of the creature are acts of a potentiality and not the same potentiality. Thus, metaphysics must first establish that they must be acts of a potentiality and that the ppotentiality cannot be the same. Then it determines what the nature of the potentiality is and what the nature of the act. This leads to the understanding of knowledge as preparing the way for causality by establishing the real relation to the effect through making the effect to be in the knower. The effect causes this through actuating the knowing capacity. Thus, created knowledge is passive rather than active. Then volition grounds the relation which is thus in the knower, i.e. makes it realizing so that the effect is then made real. The relationship both in knowledge and in realizing volition is that of similarity so that the separation of the capacities in man is a separation of this real relation. That is why it can be unseparated in God but separated in the creature. And that leads to the classical distinction of knowledge as being made similar to the object and of volition, of making the one who wills similar to the object. Knowledge is thus not unitive in the same way as will which aims at the object in its concrete reality, whereas knowledge orders itself to it in its universal reality. The real relation of causality, which thus comes from the union of knowledge and volition, is then separated out from the agent in things which do not have knowledge. 3. Similarity to Object in the Created Knower And the similarity must be to the specific thing. Thus, in the theory of human knowledge, the similarity is indeterminedly in the knowing capacity through the divine creative act which makes it what it is. And this is proportioned to essence so that essence sets the limitation. Thus, essence, capacity to operate and operation are all proportioned. 2 4. Impressed and Expressed Species The species impressa removes one indetermination of the possible intellect and makes it an efficient cause so that it produce the expressed species through which it then knows the object. The relation of similarity is thus in the actually knowing intellect. Similarity tot he effect is thus in the will through its presence in the intellect. The will, grounding it when this is within its possibilities, makes it causative. Thus the similarity to the known object which is a real relation in the intellect, is not a causal relation unless grounded by will. And only those similarities which the will can ground become real. Some, as natural, reveal what the will can do. Others, as chosen, follow from these. The limitation of this grounding is the limitation of knowledge of possibly causative similarity. The limitation of will is proportioned to this. The real relation of similarity in the intellect is to an infinity of things which cannot be realized. The similarity is thus not of the sort which grounds causality. Thus, one cannot make another person through the real relation of similarity which is the knowledge of that person. The relation of similarity, which constitutes this, is not of the sort to allow that. One cannot be similar to that in the way in which the divine cause is similar to it, or it is similar to the divine cause. Moreover, in the divine causality, the relation of similarity goes in the opposite direction. It thus inverts human objective knowledge. It is the real relation of the creature to God whereas human knowledge is the real relation of the human knower to the thing known. This must be true also of the angelic secondary knowledge. It is a real relation of the angel to the thing known by the infused knowledge. And the infusion is the causing of this real relation to be in the creature such that the creature actually relates to other creatures, somewhat as they relate to God. By nature, i.e. by creation, the capacity of the angelic intellect so to relate is potential or indeterminate. Infusion makes it determinate. 3 The relation of the creature knowing to the thing known is thus not causal with respect to all its being and therefore, to this extent, is not the fulness of the relation which the creature has to God. Neither can it be a full knowledge of the richness of that relation. The relation of the creature to God makes the creature to be made. The relation of the knowing creature to the other creature known makes it to be known. But there must be added to this the consciousness of knowing that one knows. This is identity. This is intellection of intellection. The interpretation of this shows that it does not involve a relationship of smilarity but is an identity. Therefore it follows that identity is more radical than knowledge through similarity or that being in the knowledge of the knower is the radical requirement. Thus, whatever makes a thing to be "in" the knowledge of the knower makes that thing knowable and known. And whatever makes a thing to be outside of the knowledge of the knower makes it not to be known. This underlies the conviction of the ancients that immateriality is the cause of knowledge and that materiality impedes it. And this is because materiality multiplies form, i.e. puts form outside of form. Without materiality, it would be in itself. This creates the problem of how the human mind can know material singular things qua singular. Singularity as such is no problem. Singular immaterial forms are intelligible in themselves. It is matter quantified which causes the difficulty. The form, in such a compound, directly relates to the matter and not to the quantity. But, when quantified, it is then divisible and the division produces multiplication of forms. And it must be quantified as part of its structure. This is to say that the compound of matter and form requires completion through the accident of quantity. This is similar to the requirement of completion through capacity for operation for dependent being in general. And the quantification is the condition for the qualification of the compound. And the qualification 4 is necessary for operation which is the purpose of the compound. Thus qualification is also similar to the requirement that capacity to operate and operation must be added to the structure of dependent being. Thus, dependent being, to imitate God, must not only be but also operate. And this requires the addition of capacity to operate and then operation. The operation may or not be causative. The primary knowledge of the angel is not. The secondary knowledge prepares the way for some causality but is not necessarily causative. Or is this too much to say? If infused knowledge of others is given, then does this not mean causative power? And this leads to the interpretation of human knowledge of material things as dematerialization and abstraction. If forms fuse, when removed from matter, then the form of material things should fuse with and become identical with the human knower when removed from matter. That form is in the phantasm and there, partly dematerialized. The agent intellect must then use it to make the species impressa. It is used as an instrumental cause since it produces an effect higher than itself. The agent intellect hus makes it visible, i.e. potentially understood and then, the possible intellect actually relates to the form as not in matter, i.e. does not terminate in it as in matter, i.e. makes it understood. Knowledge, in God, is pure identity. When the identity, in the creature, does not come first, then knowledge is real relation to the known, but not, as such, causative. When volition is then added, it becomes causative in so far as the volition grounds causality. Thus, causality, in this case, is a combination of knowledge (real relation) and choice (grounding but not relation). Thus knowledge and volition differ as real relation and grounding such that the grounded is then made real. In the case of causes which do not have immanent knowledge, the real relation alone exists of the cause to the effect (but not of the effect to the cause?). The real relation of effect to cause exists always in the relation to the creator. The knowledge of God is identity and through this God knows other than himself, i.e. the real relation of other things than himself. The knowledge of the angel is real relation first to its own essence and then identity in self-consciousness. The 5 knowledge of human beings is real relation to other things and then, through this, consciousness of thinking and then, through this consciousness to its essence. Thus, in human thought, consciousness of thinking leads to consciousness of essence, but, in angelic thought, consciousness of essence leads to consciousness of thinking. Thus the angel first thinks essence and then, through this, thinking. Then, by infusion, the angel thinks other things and is conscious of this. A human being first thinks other things and then, through this, knows its thinking, and, then, through this, knows its essence. The relation of causality, in the case of creation, requires reality of relation in the direction of the effect to the cause, but not in the reverse direction. But in the case of other causal relations, the relation is real in both directions. The reason for this is that all other relations require the intentional relation of the knower to the known, which is real but not causative until volition is added. Thus the effect, as such, is related to the cause, but the cause is not necessarily related to the effect really, except in the case of created causality, when this involves real knowledge. The real relation then is that of knowing, but it does not involve the knower as an effect of the known. Nevertheless, causality of an unknowing secondary cause, such as fire, is a real relation to the effect, just as the effect is a real relation to the cause. This argues that causality is separable from knowledge in the cause. The sequence is thus that matter is a real relation to form and form, a real relation to matter, and the combination of both a real relation to existence and existence a real relation to both. Then, the combination of essence and existence is a real relation to ultimate separated form, but no real relation to anything else. For all other subordinate causes, the relation is real but from cause to effect. This follows from the fact that created knowledge is a real relation to the thing known but the thing known is not really related to the knower. The root of this distinction lies in the fact that divine knowledge is purely identity, but created knowledge, real relationality since the knowing capacity is really distinct from the known thing, even when this is the essence of the knower. 6 In this case, there are two real relations, the one of inesse to the essence and the other, of knowing, which is distinct from this and actualizes the knowing capacity. The real relation of the knower to the essence, qua knowing, is an actualization of the capacity to know and therefore distinct from it. Upon this follows knowledge by reflection, i.e. through identity. The knower is in itself. Thus dependency is extrapolation of identity. And it is first real relation of the dependent to the cause with composition of essence and existence. Then it is composition of accident and essence--common and proper accidents, terminating, on the highest level, in the accidents of knowledge and volition. 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Relational Stages 1 2. Knowledge, Causality and Will 1 3. Similarity to Object in the Created Knower 2 4. Impressed and Expressed Species 3 8 '_ IMPROPMENIMMOWWW 1111111111 KAI 04 ‘4..v ft. 0011. a' 0 tiviiiitc A .CAOsALIIV al 03001 ,4061. • !lie, ./ -du. 4Pu.444/44teid 4mtl'ir 1 -?,4"if& . • (444441 ' 51... . 11" 1/14 )1 I n „. 1.4" titdit:Citli i 42/ 4 /194a4/ 1(444 A • 044 ;64N,141 04 Pbah' • tj 4ttter‘A #14/ jf-ted ,44!' -'itomveele, z, 444., ,,:c.r.trot- 44 irse•a;tedt. 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KNOWLEDGE a^ DEFINITION OF 1 'RAo e ~ KrA i' 8 j A44444140% • 1~ruwir 1~+lovvw 1960 . oo 1 he determinatiok of the conceptual ratio which characterii~ ' iwledge seems to be a matter of such ease that there is no discussion concerning it. This ratio is that of assimilation. According to it, knowledge is defined as a similitude of a knower to a known thing. 3440 4 x 444, 2 ince this implies that t K e nature of knowledge puts it in between the knower and the known, St. Thomas then characterizes knowledge as this too: a medium between a knower and a known thing. kmossve atAito Known, ' alku4wit 3 Since such a medium contains both terms, and unites them, it can be said to identify them. For as far as the knower is concerned, this is a sort of extension of his being, which makes him what he previously was not, but without loss of his previous beingness. 4 If, therefore, knowledge be considered a part of the beingness of the knower, then by it the knower is all things, without ceasing to maintain his distinction from other things on a different level of being. 5 Problems: Now if we suppose that this identification of knowledge with "assimilation" is correct, we still have difficulties to clear up. For assimilation is a ratio which admits of wide variety. Perhaps not every manifestation of this variety fits the reality of knowledge. Therefore, the variety must first be careful'y elucidated; and then the properties of the variety must be clearly determined; and then what exactly pertains to knowledge must be determined, and what,cannot pertain to i t . 1, 04%440 mow kMIw444, . Aotitnat, 4#44A 4, 6 Another Problem: if this sort of elucidation is necessary, how is it then that at the beginning, before it is made, the mind can fasten upon similarity as the generic reality of knowledge?14 ~,, awbi4n~00t t ta . Lf.~ten 7 Another Problem: If the mind does fasten upon this genus and in this way, in order to define knowledge, is it the mind on the level of philosophy, or on a lower level? Can it be the mind on the level of the myth or of common sense? 'SS A, 1 204 A`+F. 04. 0. c.PW1Mt 4wt1, t1 04 41Q►w%* ttw 4, A' \1 1 8 Reply to Problem, Primacy of Ratio: it is possible for the mind to perceive the application of a ratio before it perceives clearly .may the variety of possible forms which the ratio may take. Here it would t‘ohl, seem that this is the situation because of the conception of what knowledge is for the lowest level of approach. There, knowledge is obviously a phenomenon of a knower in which what is outside of him gets into him. This creates two terms: that which is outside; that which is inside. These terms are obviously distinct, since the knower remains distinct from the thing known; and yet they are obviously somewhat the same since the knower gets the known thing into him, which means that he is in some way like the known thing. Something of the known thing is in him. But this necessarily produces the relation of similitude. 0441464 www.., 444k qivw Wale *die a tivat iit Utttdo, atc, s bd6n9'emo oi 4444 V"'"' a we, iI" NM Ā Mu, . `Te ! .t. 0 t~1t' ~4. ~s00 tbi 144/ 4444, et a' a 044440 tibatattin- 44A, (ANo ,44s onk'Mugto 4,Atm ca, b cewvtd, vett i keukr glf0100 bwt Milt ovu, ~ _ 144 V 40 5 14140, ~w ba ~b~e dki, Cew~p n e: 'o ō ow # wto; tor w H a ~ owl 34.tokka-6- ~ 0 Ow 404441 aot iltremv, V /net buawy'Lt' N' 4 or flu ŌN4 e cil goo. , b mmo- 64 WwIM~I~w c/Vt it N 444t adr Ua ' ~ ~ - ~ 1444 ~ 44k b t ao acw~ - 144i IV OD 04, Div phw,pt w dw oria, k ►u w :14,454 q ua t ' awttr 0 ,t14;(1 otti4 74i, 0.t ' it. iv* more 44 A1M asie, It: t M a tiv , - ; 4444:i kto, ~ ' N I 40 covet y oouia. tf trial titsikvs, but o f maim tttn, 03 o 'wr "k1.wt a" it3 tl f ao a ° ras p ' ; or a4.. 6 ",avn~tk t~rdi,. N 4 tvyv" t, „ ati ms. ac'ow e 'nv - /4#' a, w attb~ta~c~.. b ti o i to. ACci~dtWh' ov a nb 4ts , kotzca. t%ot4--c ur nett if $.44444- tt o rsoolul 0141 4 nu4.4440? (.1 o;IrN,CV Yn• vao•iM 4 44-41,4 10.4- ttakj, So*, r;= h c uv et ` .4 a esitpc a toy, it ā,,y T ultitonsZkit1 14: 4, ovitc4, cwit "tts0 ItAt coug4.44. tt‘tL.— a * cril wrwtt'n4. bct ā an~Mwti+, _'i o, vivemWt ctif ilativ"trN egg, " Auk w4/4101. low 1k~rJ rwti kitatitym _ rat io :It:14U bttor Viilho'""Ark 4ttni *ftle ri cto:Of ilt*tr "- 4, 11 ,Ii= /144 4 44.445040, N&w d ,.w • aa+ctw vs* pt, w : r, KlNNOWS CE . DEFINITION OF 2 1960 APR, 29. 1 Therefore, Even on the Common Sense Level, it is clear that Knowledge is a similitude, or that a similitude enters into knowledge. The ratio is seen to apply, although exactly how it applies is not perfectly clear. 2 Seeing this, some of the the ratio. They posited terms. Thus, if knowledge is this must be because there is It therefore follows that the and that if this were not the ancient Greeks then went on to concretize that the similarity must lie between similar similarity, and if a man sees fire, then fire both in the knower and in the known thing. knower knows because there is fire in him, case, he would not know. 3 It is interesting that this exposition of what the relation or ratio of similarity is in the concrete is quite different from that of Locke and many other thinkers before and after him. These tend to posit not so much the reality of "fire" in the knower as a condition for his knowledge, but the "image" of fire. They therefore conceive of the "similarity" reality of knowledge as that which holds between image and the thing of which it is the image. 4 Another conception too, quite similar in some respects, is that which holds between a sign and the thing signified. The sign is similar to that which it signifies, and points to the latter. So knowledge is similar to the thing known and points to it. This is perhaps a more sophisticated comparison, and seems to have certain relations with verbalization of knowledge, rather than with the pure entity of knowledge itself directly. 5 Nevertheless, all such comparisons have something to contribute to the understanding of the ratio of similarity as found in knowledge. 6 It would seem that the first comparison would not, however, be that of image and thing imaged. This would seem to be only a consequent comparison derived from the perception that the similarity of the knower and the known cannot be as that between two real terms having the same real nature"- fire in the knower of the followers of Empedocles. 7 Nevertheless, too, it would seem that after the identification of the ratio in a general way, it is only by rational criticism that this particular application is set aside. The process involved seems to be this: 1. the determination of the ratio of intelligibility in general 2. the determination of the various ways in which this ratio exists, and the application of those ways to knowledge. 3. the dtermination, among those ways, of what cannot be applied to knowledge 4. the abstracting of the ratio in the highest sense and its application. Q Sn~ --+1 ► 5'44 Sr bot, 1 OttiC ;74:ZoS6 auv, 4444 1,44 Oi w r(NOWL-IGF. DEFINITION OF ,$b INN 2)tivtiatiptv ° J Kitow1464_ , 444 fro 4 ° 4 'N tt06 A P'W 4 4444. - ; , ,~r¢1G~wac0l ii thy -~ utroAcoto 4 tosri J, us+0w" iucit, Mcla nti? ~ J-+ t' Sis++ivit- 4. Mo~al itt0 040, Of Cn~o e~,~ b b c4141 tam, kat, M r, kv. wsati loono also. 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M v 4444R4 , aa rtriotiaG,if St, Ī ow~o ohlt t o a a~ ,~ov~+tio G ~ ~tit 140 alit, d4,4, tth ito , frr C4 4vt,I•, t A level/ sU c ot . ' ht, Fro frf oo ws, Olie 41444 A; k s 'UAW b Awotkv aa ; 4 tdc i'ow aw At, , '1 ° TOW %WA 044 L1vc aml e i4o 1w+owi4 J,444. *444a*ti.. 40 MO rtiPS. , 4444R At4L o AS" it444440v‘cti, kaiht 'e a. 3' nvoc444.4w r li ,i,~lt, eihNOI: s.- to q,~~. comatowinua a, w it #44 4 'rw 40 `Rti1A CO/tt Ct , f. ww4r$ 1 1114, A 1Z1tOWlebt6 A , QV $L out 1 444i 444V 44tt Popi6sos t m cc iictAnow4i, 4 Y 1t,uww by tit4Ktisvs t tsto o154 4,454- bv IfgHttowwkiotay so -rc4:. WS OM b y y ati ~i ►ww1 ad+ o iebtc~ro a ~ °`041 4 7,1att 01 4114*Vicr tpAt camalitb 1~ fiku+a aat hatv1 ., otltw ntittom rosim.voc.e DEFINITION OF 3 'rao;n~ w4dt4 1akly, 0 5t1 19 milk! 3 0th r Relations inKnowledge Metaphysics: Knowledge: Rational: Judge- ment (smaller binders) discusses other relations which are found in knowledge besides that of similarity. It shows that in the judgement, these are such relations as those of adequation, identity. It shows that these seem so closely bound up with the nature of the judgement that they pertain to it in a specific way. Other sorts of knowledge, which do not have the nature of the judgement, do not have these relations. 2 Thus it would seem that they are not to be found in sensation. In sensation, there is not combinigg of semi contents distinct only qua being sensed. Therefore there is no properly compositive action. Therefore there is no adequation which follows upon composition. Therefore there is no truth, which is the essence of judicial adeqaation. 14411 og' 4 0444441,4 , 3 Perhaps we might escape from this difficulty by saying that there is no conscious truth, or known adequation. But this is invalid. The relationship of adqquation requires that there be a distinction of terms. In the sense operation of knowing, there is identity or unity of knower and known and therefore not a distinction of terms. 4 To be more clear: in sensation, the senser becomes the sensed thing and therefore cannot be distinguished from it, as is required for the comparison of adequation. This distinction exists in the judgement where, although the knower is also the thing, and is similar to the thing and is one with it in knowledge, the knower is also compositive of conceptual distinctions concerning the thing. This act of composition is in the knower and not in the thing. And it distinguishes the knower from the thing. 5 Recapitulation: by these determinations, we have moved from the notion of the similarty of the knower and the thing known in the act of knowledge, to the preperties relationship of identity of the knower and the thing known. This latter relationship is not to immediate. In fact, it tends to be denied, in some sense. For it is obvious that in one way, the known thing and the knower are not the same, nor one. And yet it is also obvious that the known thigg in some way enters "into" the knower. It thus enters into the knower and yet remains distinct from the knower. The problem for a realistic theory of knowledge is to find some way of showing that this is possible. -1404 Affi4LI*00414tomkorft c4. soigii,it, 7 Tegatti, Citttnw 6 Various Theori s Bui t From This Point It is in the endeavor to do this that the various theories concerning the nature of knowledge arise. Some of them fasten on the fact that knowledge is a sort of symbolization. Words are used to indicate ideas. Could it not be that the total beingness of the ideas is simply "to be indicated':? This would seem to elmminate the difficulty of explaining universals as realities. However, this is not a universal definition of what knowledge is, but a particular definition of what a particular type of knowledge may be. Obviously it is not applicable to sensation. It still leaves open the question as to what sensation may be. I wIv 060 lckrw4it tt040 ini:65446 044t4 ftt5cantc acai; , It's/ ntih Pt 'tout bwt a mu44.1 ajc~. 4%, 'ti ~ ib w; objxt autlo'c~t ~, rt A AA, Ittowy ottat m Al lorokob i,- -out n i , ► jacr, = a 1 41 "1 4,4 40 141X4e Wibk 1 - b ob jit'io :41, *11 , VAW$4~ at byy~ ic{v l2www ā 'w~. +i, 4 cau ° .. ats , by i4 ett*- 44 lia i l, RA 0t obj ia0/441 e je* ntb< s. tow cteo maaIR4 " tbv _ 41,144. film 1444 Art K«eNIV4 1 similarity May be Considered to Be of Two Sorts a. the similarity of things possessing the same real form b. the similarity of an image and that of which it is the image 1960 MAI 3 .1 46vowLeDOI . Deft'Jti toNU o1 It If therefore 'knowledge is a similarity between the knower and the known, it would seem that it might be either of these. Some of the early Greek philosophers adopted the first view. Most modern thinkers seem to follow pretty much the second view. If these are the only possible types of similarity, then we are held either to accept one of them as applicabee to knowledge or to reject the motion of knwledge as similarity at all. 3 A Variation of the Second Notion a. an essentially passive faculty receives an image of the reality acting upon it 1. a perfect image 2. an image which is fundamentally representative of reality but admits of subjective impressions which are not similar to the real at all b. a partially active faculty 1. this produces something in the known object, as, for example, combinations and juxtapositions which are not to be attttbuted to nature 4 6 Thus, the consideration of particular operation of knowledge - chiefly those removed from the extreme of sensation - lead some to deny the similarity conception of knowledge, at least as respects the activity of the particular facuttiies, and as regards nature. A Criticism It seems that this view is bound up with the notion that the reason for the presence of similarity in knowledge, and the cause of the image, is the passivity of the faculty. If this is replaced by the notion of the activity of the faculty, then it would seem that the notion of similarity might be dropped. Yet, the replacing of the notion of the passivity of the faculty with that of its activity does not strike at the root of the similarity relationship. It simply replaces the agent responsible for the object of knowledge. The question still remains: how is the knower joined in knowledge to the "object" regardless of what may be the truth as to the cause of the object. 7 Clearly, even here, we must distinguish between the operation of causing the object, and the operation of knowing. If the knowing faculty itself is the cause of the object, its causality is not the same thing, at all events, as its knowledge of the object. So Kant, at least, believed. 8 Yet this may be open to criticism. Perhaps for the constructive imagination, to make is to know. But then to make is also bound up in similarity, and would not eliminate this from the situation. ° Met A `"1 AN P ` ►, w cw 4 fpti aft 0 wcl ' b40 o ;- aof~~4v c oaa and 5 6 /'\ 1960 MAI - 4 'CT\i Ltb 63. 1 Résumé of Thought Up To Now The attempt to define knowledge which DEft'NrlY4 p. we have up to now made shows that it has a beginning in the perception of the ratio of similarity between the knower and the known. From this perception, as a point of departure, the attempt then goes on to determine particular examples of this ratio and to try to apply their properties to knowledge. Now the most obvious immediate example is that of similarity between distinct things having the same form. This example gives rise to the theorizing of the early Greek thinkers that sense knowledge takes place by the real presence in the knower of that which is similar to khat he knows: fire in the eye when it knows fire and so forth. 'Dia1 'cA 2 31 1 4 t%' ~t; 2 he a ttep is he dialectical criticism of this position. It can be shown to involve absurdity in itself, and therefore not to be an admissible theory. If knowledge involves the real presence of the similar form in the knower, then the knower, who perceives contrarie s must have these contrary forms in him at once, which is impossible. And ~I the fact that knowledge obviously touches on an infinity of things would mean that an infinity of real forms would have to be in the knower. This also is impossible. Therefore the theory is to be rejected. ON 4411ft. yok, 34. 44t 3 mut it is to be noted that the theory is a particularization of the general perception that similarity is involved in sense knowledge. When it is rejected, therefore, the genus of the perception is not rejected bu but only the species. Oukk 4 The Platonic Conception If we maintain the genus and reject the speicies, perhaps we can save the situation by conceiving of the causality involved in knowledge as other than that presented by the first theory. According to this position, the sensible reality imprints something of itself in the eye or the ear. Reversing this, then, let us hold instead that the eye or the ear imprints something in the reality, whereby it is seen. This is to conceive seeing not as a pasaive reception, but as an active illuminating. This would correspond to the common sense expression: my ear "makes known to me" or my "eye makes known to me': It would say that the action of the sensible quality on the faculty does not "make known`: This is the result only of the action of the faculty. The justification of this position would seem to lie in the improportion between the effect achieved and the supposed cause. The effect achieved is sense knowledge; the supposed cause is a thing incapable of sense knowledge. Therefore the effect lies beyond its power and must be imputed to another power. But in this case, the other power must reach out and "effect" something in the known thing. The eye does this by some sort of emission. It is more like a lamp than like a glass. But this conception is itself open to criticism, although it does tkke into account something of the truth concerning what knowledge is. Even in its further modification whereby the sense organ becomes the instrument of the knower to work upon the known, and whereby the known becomes that which terminates and resists the knower in its action, and is known in so far as it does this, it is still open to serious criticism. Its chief failure is to reveal what "to sense resistance" is. For causes which are resisted do not, by that fact, sense the resistance. 7 Nature of Knowledge in This Conception Is it still "similarity" between knower and knven? Clearly it is, since it is similarity between agent and effect. 'itlN 't% dwaciat Now"~ halt okck., 41r4gsv re40 ‘0•411 4 .1°U 'tali 14M 44•4404 sit h. pAck I anw trixt$4, irowv4s I, ititto 0,414 44 :61 0 ,,tw Aroma , 16414, 4-11,11M, ,q _ r - - 1044031., mono; •_ ro r r:: Zorwo b 4' j -_ _rrio; „_ 71011414,4 Afvuom It) 4_ 1W 01•.60110.. '141 41Iti 11111M=41'%11ri1M ' 14 ; r 1~UU 1'1ii1 -KtormILEDqt 1 Platonic Definition The definition implied by this Platonic notion 33ffiwhIv o~ is therefore that knowledge is an action of the knower upon the known. This is by opposition to the previous notion in which it is an action of the known upon the knower. 2 But it would seem not to differ from the previous one in that both it and the previous theory posit real terms of similarity in the knower and the known. The previous theory would make the real form of the known the cause of the real form in the knower through which knowledge would take place. This would make the real form in the knower the cause of the real form in the known (real form of being known as such, perhaps). That this latter is a real form would seem to be indicated in the fact that it is caused by real causality, in which something is transmitted from the knower to the known. Thus, the eye exudes small particles which strike the known thing. The eye "flashes': 3 The Impossibility of This Notion Leads to Another: the Image Theory a. the impossibility: perhaps for the most of the thinkers who reject the theory, it is more the improbability or the lack of verisimilitude which leads to the rejection. It does not seem to be the fact of the per se absurdity of the theory. This latter is indicated by those who ask: how can anything get into anything else? It is also indicatdd by those who distinguish bbjectivity in knowledge from the subjectivity of information, and realize that the former is not supplied by the simple /fact of the latter. They also realize that knowledge cannot be absolute being, and that of all the relational being, only similarity seems at first the applicable one. b. the image theory: according to this theory, the sensible reality does not produce real fire etc in the knower, but only the image of these things. By an image they understand an arrangement of colors and lines and volumes and shapes such as to resemble the particular thing imaged. The image is certainly a similarity of such a thing, although not by the real possession of the full form according to which the similarity is said to take place. Thus, the image of a face does not mean the specific reproduction of the face in another thing, but only the reproduction of some of the accidents of the face and according to appearnaces. This position seems to get around the difficulty of positing a real fire etc. in the knower as such. But it does not necessarily come to grips with the Platonic contention that knowing is an acting of the knower on the known rather than the inverse. The Weakened Image Theory This theory by the contention that some effects of sensible reality upon the knower could others could not. Thus, some maintain and the common sensibles are real, but is then modified the action of the be called images, but that figure and shape not color or sound. (~ din C t,- n0.'0; W~tFlitty~ : t~hai(~lr 'GM Ī IV C4 bc ytri, awv aVl auk ~ uk i lai,: io~ . knovit . wki(ir h ►l, A~j. hcti o; M~W. , V tintaAreestiot 644.1c,tt co44004 atttri4,4 Aiw# ► W






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